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  Incentives for Knowledge Production with Many Producers 
 
Presentation to the European Commission/U.S. National Science 
Foundation/Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Conference 
on 
Networks of Knowledge: Research and Policy for the Knowledge-Based Economy 
Brussels, June 7, 2004 
 
The starting point for thinking about economic policy for the knowledge economy 
is that the production of information and knowledge is characterized by relatively 
high fixed costs and low marginal costs. In addition, such production is highly 
cumulative (uses prior output as input or is subject to continuous enhancement 
over  time)  and  usually  has  somewhat  uncertain  useful  application.  Therefore, 
social and possibly even private welfare can often be increased by the provision of 
new  knowledge  to  large  numbers  of  individuals  at  a  low  price.  Wide  access 
increases the productivity of the knowledge both as an input to future knowledge 
creation, and as the basis for the production of new goods and services. The central 
problem  becomes  the  design  of  incentive  systems  that  both  reward 
inventors/knowledge producers and encourage dissemination of their output.  
 
The basic ideas in the opening paragraph above have been familiar to economists 
and other scholars for a long time (e.g., Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962), Scotchmer 
(1991), etc.), but their importance has increased with the advent of the internet and 
other computer networking methods used in the production of research, often over 
long distances. The principal effect of the increase in computer networking and 
internet use is that it lowers the marginal cost of distributing codified knowledge to 
the  point  where  it  is  essentially  zero.  This  in  turn  has  the  potential  to  reduce 
incentives for production of such knowledge or to increase the demands of the 
producers for protection of their property rights to the knowledge.  
 
In this paper, I briefly review the motivation for inventive behavior and describe 
the two incentive systems that harness and encourage such behavior. This review 
of well-trodden ground is performed only so that the effects on these systems of 
the rise of  the networked  knowledge economy  can  be  noted.  Some  theoretical 
results  on  the  operation  and  stability  of  the  two  incentive  systems  for  the 
production of knowledge are presented with a discussion of how they might apply 
in the networked economy. The paper concludes with suggestions on open research 
questions.    2
1  Two (or three) worlds of invention 
 
If we wish to think about policy towards knowledge production, we must first ask 
what motivates the producers of knowledge. Key factors that have been identified 
in the literature are curiosity and a taste for science, money, the desire for fame and 
reputation, and as a secondary goal, promotion or tenure (Stephan 1996). The latter 
two goals are usually achieved via priority in publication, that is, being the first to 
get  a  discovery  into  print.  Although  monetary  income  is  clearly  a  partial 
motivation in the search for reputation and promotion, considerable evidence exists 
that for researchers in universities and public research organizations with some 
level of guaranteed income the first motive, intellectual curiosity, is of overriding 
importance (e.g., Isabelle 2004). For this type of researcher, the desire for financial 
rewards is often driven by the desire to fund their own scientific research (Lee 
2000) rather than by consumption per se. Scientists’ motivations also are colored 
by the culture in which they are embedded, with traditional norms giving way to a 
more market-oriented view among some younger scientists today (Isabelle 2004, 
Owen-Smith and Powell 2001). 
 
Several scholars (e.g., David, Merton, etc.) have described the two regimes that 
allocate resources for the creation of new knowledge: one is the system of granting 
intellectual  property  rights,  as  exemplified  by  modern  patent  and  copyright 
systems, the other is the “open science” regime, as often found in the realm of 
“pure” scientific research and sometimes in realm of commercial technological 
innovation, often in infant industries (Allen 1983; Nuvolari 2001). Today we also 
see  this  system  to  a  certain  extent  in  the  production  of  free  and  open  source 
software. The first system assigns clear property rights to newly created knowledge 
that allow the exclusion of others from using that knowledge, as well as the trading 
and  licensing  of  the  knowledge.  As  is  well-known,  such  a  system  provides 
powerful  incentives  for  the  creation  of  knowledge,  at  the  cost  of  creating 
temporary monopolies that will tend to restrict output and raise price. Additionally, 
in  such  systems,  the  transaction  costs  of  combining  pieces  of  knowledge  or 
building on another’s knowledge may be rather high, and in some cases achieving 
first or even second best incentives via ex post licensing impossible (Scotchmer 
1991). The use of other firms’ knowledge output will often require payment or 
reciprocal  cross-licensing,  which  means  negotiation  costs  have  to  be  incurred. 
Finally,  obtaining  IP  rights  usually  requires  publication,  but  only  of  codified 
knowledge, and trade secrecy protection is often used in addition.  
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The second set of institutional arrangements, sometimes referred to as the norms 
governing the “Republic of Science,” generates incentives and rewards indirectly: 
the creation of new knowledge is rewarded by increased reputation, further access 
to  research  resources,  and possible subsequent financial  returns  in  the  form of 
increased salary, prizes, and the like (Merton 1957, 1968). This system relies to 
some extent on the fact that individuals often invent or create for nonpecuniary 
reasons like curiosity. Dissemination of research results and knowledge is achieved 
at relatively low cost, because assigning the “moral rights” to the first publisher of 
an addition to the body of knowledge gives creators an incentive to disseminate 
rapidly  and  broadly.  Therefore,  in  this  system  the  use  of  others’  output  is 
encouraged  and  relatively  cheap,  with  the  cost  being  appropriate  citation  and 
possibly some reciprocity in sharing knowledge. But it is evident that this system 
cannot  capture  the  same  level  of  private  economic  returns  for  the  creation  of 
knowledge. Inventors must either donate their work or receive compensation as 
clients of public or private patrons.
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I have written elsewhere about the tension that arises when these two systems 
come  up  against  each  other  (Hall  2004).  For  example,  it  is  common  for  the 
difference in norms and lack of understanding of the potential partner’s needs and 
goals to produce breakdowns in negotiations between industry and academe. These 
breakdowns can have an economic as well as cultural cause, as shown by Anton 
and Yao (2002) in a study of contracting under asymmetric information about the 
value of the knowledge to be exchanged. In addition there is the simple fact that 
both  systems rely on  reciprocal behavior between both  parties  to a knowledge 
exchange, so that contracting between participants in the two difference systems 
becomes subject to misunderstanding or worse. This is illustrated by the reaction 
of the genomic industry in the U.S. when asked to take out licenses to university-
generated technology: once the university starts acting like a private sector firm, 
there is a temptation to start charging them for the use of the outputs of industry 
research,  and  consequent  negative  effects  on  researchers  who  still  believed 
themselves part of the “open science” regime.  
 
Before leaving this topic, notice should be taken of an important variation of the 
“open science” regime for the sharing of knowledge production outputs, one which 
has existed many times in the development of industry throughout history: the free 
exchange and spillover of knowledge via personnel contact and movement, as well 
as reverse engineering, without resort to intellectual property protection. I will call 
this system the CI regime, for collective invention. Examples include the collective   4
invention in the steel and iron industry described by Allen (1983), the development 
of the semiconductor industry in Silicon Valley (Hall and Ziedonis 2001), and the 
silk industry in Lyons during the ancien regime that was described by Foray and 
Hilaire-Perez  (2004).  In  these  environments,  most  of  which are  geographically 
localized innovation areas with social as well as business relationships that build 
trust  (or  at  least  knowledge  of  whom  to  trust),  the  incentive  system  for  the 
production and exchange of knowledge is somewhat different than in either of the 
other two systems.  
 
The first and most obvious difference is that the production of “research” in the 
industry setting is supported not by public or private patronage but by commercial 
firms that finance it by the sale of end products that incorporate their discovery. 
Because rewards come from the sale of products rather than information itself, as 
they  do in the conventional  IP-based system,  the sharing  of  information  about 
incremental innovations is motivated by different considerations than in the case of 
the OS regime. Although priority is not per se valuable except in the sense that it 
may  confer  lead  time  for  production,  shared  knowledge,  especially  about 
incremental improvements to a complex product, is perceived to be useful and 
essential for the progress of the entire industry including the firm that shares the 
knowledge.  When  an  industry  is  advancing  and growing  rapidly, the  desire  to 
exclude competitors from the marketplace is not as strong as when an industry 
reaches maturity. An implication is that this form of free exchange of knowledge 
tends to break down, or is unstable over time, as has happened in many of the 
historical examples. In the next section of the paper I report on some models that 
try to capture this idea and give conditions where the academic or industry-based 
OS regime might break down. 
 
2  Stability of incentive system equilibria 
 
Gambardella  and  Hall  (2003,  2004)  explore  the  conditions  under  which  these 
different systems of knowledge generation and sharing develop, and when they 
might be expected to break down. That is, what sets the boundary lines between 
the domains in which these two regimes, one of freely shared knowledge and one 
of proprietary knowledge, are found, and how stable is that boundary to external 
forces or the behavior of individual actors? To do this, we use two simple models, 
one of collective invention in the commercial arena, and one of “open science,” 
both of which are based on the basic insight in Olson (1971). We show that the 
only  way  to  get  a  stable  equilibrium  with  individuals  operating  under  “open   5
sharing”  rules is  when there  is coordination among individuals. Otherwise, the 
sharing (cooperative) equilibrium tends to break down because some individuals 
find it in their interest to defect. We also give conditions under which there are 
more or fewer individuals contributing to the good.  
 
In Gambardella and Hall (2003), we present two models, one for the collective 
invention case, and one that applies to the open scientific research setting when IP 
is available. The collective invention model hypothesizes that the joint output of a 
set of user-innovators is used to produce a good of variable quality that is sold in 
the  market  by  an  oligopolist  facing  downward  sloping  demand.  The  user-
innovators care about the quality of the final good as well as about their own 
income, but the relative importance of these two factors varies across them, so they 
are  heterogeneous.  Each  one  chooses  whether  to  operate  under  OS  rules  and 
charge  marginal  cost  for  their  output  or  to  take  out  a  patent  and  charge  the 
monopoly price. Clearly they weigh their effect on the quality of the output against 
the increase in income from a higher price in making this decision. We show that 
unless they can be coordinated by a lead user-innovator or a set of norms, it is 
individually rational to deviate to IP, at  least as the number of them  becomes 
greater than a very few. It is also true that the benefit from deviation becomes 
stronger  as  the  market  size  increases.  This  may  provide  at  least  a  partial 
explanation  of  the  observation  that  free  knowledge  sharing  seems  to  be  more 
prevalent in immature industries.
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Our model of open science versus privatization assumes that a body of scientific 
knowledge in a particular area will be supplied jointly by scientists supported by 
government grants and by scientists financed by the market, who have the option 
of taking out patents and selling their knowledge output to competitive firms at a 
monopoly price. We call the first group the OS sector and the second group the IP 
sector.  Examples  might  be  production  of  information  about  a  particular  gene 
sequence and its use, or the production of a scientific database from a variety of 
inputs. Note that the scientists operating under IP may not be in the private sector, 
but could represent university researchers working through a technology transfer 
office. In our model all scientists are assumed to have a taste for scientific output 
(the  body  of  knowledge)  per  se  and  also  for  income,  but  the  relative  tradeoff 
between the two is heterogeneous across scientists. This seems to us to capture the 
true state of affairs fairly well.  
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The government  that  supports  scientific research faces  a  budget  constraint and 
allocates funds to those who wish to work under OS while maximizing scientific 
output. We show that without coordination and as the number of scientists in the 
area increases beyond a very small number, the only stable equilibrium is one 
where all the scientists work under IP rules. This is because an individual scientist 
who deviates from OS to IP receives a discrete jump in income, but only reduces 
public  scientific  output  (for  which  he  has  a  taste)  by  an  infinitesimal  amount. 
Therefore, some of form of coordination, social norm, or willingness to imitate the 
behavior  of  “lead  researchers” or  conform  to  the  expectations  of  university  or 
research  organization  administrations  is  needed  to  enforce  an  equilibrium  with 
scientists working under OS rules. But, of course, this is exactly what the norms of 
the “Republic of Science” provide.  
 
We model the existence of social norms or leaders in the community by assuming 
that  deviation  from  OS  to  IP  occurs  only  when  a  measurably  large  group  of 
scientists leave together. With this kind of coordination, we find that an interior 
equilibrium with some scientists working under OS and some under IP will usually 
exist. We also show that the share of scientists working under OS will decrease if 
the  demand  for  research  output  from  the  downstream  firms  increases,  the 
government  reduces  its  budget  for  scientific  research,  or  fewer  scientists 
coordinate when they change regimes. All three of these factors appear to be at 
work at various times and places in the recent past, so it is perhaps not surprising 
that we have observed more attention paid to securing intellectual property rights 
on the part of university researchers.  
 
Gambardella and Hall (2004) extend the above model to show that a mechanism 
that  can  work  to  enforce  the  OS  equilibrium  and  increase  the  diffusion  of 
knowledge in a setting like the one above is a type of viral or copyleft licensing at 
zero cost, where the licensor is also required to license his output to others at zero 
cost if its production uses the licensed knowledge input. In effect, this mechanism 
resembles the General Public License (GPL) used in open source software. As we 
indicate below, an unresolved question is how to achieve sufficient production of 
certain auxiliary services and support when such a license is in place. In our paper, 
we  provide  empirical  evidence  that  shows  the  widespread  privatization  of  an 
incidental  output  of  applied  economic  research,  econometric  software,  largely 
because the production of such software is not part of the research output that is 
rewarded under the norms of “open science” and because researchers in the field 
demand a set of services that cannot be supported using public funds.    7
Several  conclusions  have  emerged  from  the  observation  and  modeling  of  two 
stylized ways of sharing and protecting knowledge production: 
1.  The  OS  model  works  best  when  there  are  common  norms  and  the 
community is relatively small, or focused on a common goal, such as the 
advancement of science or the growth of a new industry. 
2.  Larger and more profitable markets are likely to lead to defection from OS 
to IP, and once that has happened it is difficult to go back. That is, IP tends 
to be an absorbing state.
3 
3.  Finally, the OS model relies to some extent either on public financing or 
on tolerance or even active encouragement by industrial firms of leakage 
and spillovers from the efforts of their employees. 
 
3  Research questions 
 
In  this  paper I  have  tried to  provide  a  framework  for  thinking  about different 
modes of knowledge sharing and their consequences for the incentives to produce 
knowledge, one which is admittedly rather simplified relative to the complexity of 
arrangements in place in various arenas. In my view this framework is as valid for 
the networked economy as it is for the traditional knowledge economy. What may 
have changed in the present day are the costs of diffusing knowledge relative to the 
cost of producing it and the cohesion of the communities that produce it. The 
second implies that breakdown of systems with free trading of knowledge are more 
likely to occur.  
 
The effects of the change to the relative costs of diffusing knowledge are more 
complex. One implication is that social welfare is likely to be enhanced by more 
diffusion at zero price (online journals that are freely accessible, etc.). However, 
there is still the problem of paying for the complementary inputs to the diffusion 
process, such as cyberinfrastructure, software, maintenance, customer service, and 
so forth. None  of  these activities  normally yield returns in the “open science” 
system in the form of priority, so they will be underprovided in that system. Some 
of them, such as cyberinfrastructure, will probably be provided by government 
funding. But how much, and should any of the investment be charged to users? 
 
A central question for research and policy is the question of how the different 
regimes  for knowledge sharing interact  and  what happens  when  they  come  up 
against  each  other?  For  example,  suppose  that  a  member  of  the  open  science 
community  decides  to  privatize  some  of  his  or  her  knowledge  by  licensing  it   8
exclusively to a commercial firm? Will this cause that particular area of research to 
slow down (because researchers no longer have access to certain results costlessly) 
or to speed up (because commercial demand for research in that area increases)? Is 
there  really a  present day danger that the absorbing state of IP will  take over 
scientific  research?  On  this  subject  we  have  the  survey  results  of  Walsh  et  al 
(2003)  for  the  biotechnology  industry.  They  find  that  recent  increases  in  the 
patenting of research tools in the United States has not  impeded pharmaceutical 
industry or university research, at least not yet. They do find that there have been 
delays and sometimes restrictions in obtaining access to patented research tools, 
and cases of research redirection (as in Lerner 1995). They also find widespread 
use of “working solutions” such as taking out licenses, inventing around patents, 
infringement (often informally invoking a research exemption), developing and 
using  public  tools,  and  challenging  patents  in  court.  However,  the  survey  was 
conducted prior to the Madey decision, which effectively removes the research 
exemption defense, so more work in this area is needed. 
 
Another area for future research would look at the changing incentives faced by 
researchers operating under the traditional norms of science as research becomes 
highly collaborative and linked across a network. As implied by the models I have 
reviewed,  larger  communities  that  are  not  geographically  localized  will  find  it 
more difficult to sustain a cooperative equilibrium if IP protection is available. In 
addition, the Mertonian reward system is based very strongly on identifying the 
knowledge producer who is “first” but this becomes considerably more difficult 
when there are large number of such producers located in very different systems. 
There are important differences between, for example, the U.S. and continental 
European reward systems with respect to job tenure, with U.S. researchers usually 
working for 7 to 10 years post-degree before being assured of a permanent job, and 
European researchers commonly receiving tenure shortly after they are hired. Do 
such  differences  make  collaboration  problematic  because  the  participants  are 
facing different reward structures? 
 
The  models  presented  earlier  capture  a  phenomenon  that  has  frequently  been 
observed in practice, which is the tendency for the introduction or strengthening of 
IP rights in some area to lead to privatization of invention output. But they leave a 
number of question unanswered. First, none of our models explicitly incorporates 
the reward system of Mertonian science. Although they do allow for a generic taste 
for science on the part of the researcher or quality on the part of the innovator, his 
rewards are not directly linked to his productivity. Doing so would complicate the   9
analysis and make it easier to achieve interior solutions, although the basic results 
would survive.  
 
Second, our models currently contain no welfare analysis; we do not know yet 
under  which  conditions  the  cooperative  knowledge  sharing  equilibrium  yields 
higher output at lower cost than the IP regime. The former keeps costs lower and 
allows  more  spillovers,  but  incentives  may  be  too  low-powered  to  encourage 
production of certain essential inputs (such as supporting software or customer 
service). The latter has powerful incentives but may tend to constrain output. This 
problem  is of course  general, and similar to  the questions in antitrust,  but  the 
particularities  of  its  application  to  the  production  of  scientific  research  and  its 
auxiliary output deserve further study. 
 
Finally, the models do not yet tell us how to get a combination of outputs created 
by different knowledge sharing systems supplied at the right level for society. This 





1 We can subsume both cases as instances of “patronage”---self patronage of the 
donated efforts is a special case of this. See David (1993) and Dasgupta and David 
(1994).  
2 There are of course many other things going on as the industry develops, such as 
shakeout  and  consolidation,  as  well  as  vertical  disintegration,  that  may  also 
encourage the development of the use of IPRs.  
3 Although see Nuvolari (2004) for an apparent example where the presence of 
strongly  enforced  patents  in  the  steam  engine  industry  (Watt’s)  led  to  a 
development  of  a  collective  invention  model  in  Cornwall  for  steam-driven 
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